And while this is how things are commonly pitched in theoretical cognitive science -- as a battle between behaviorism and cognitivism, or between computationalism and connectionism, say -- I think this way of looking at matters is unhelpful and misleading. The Jerusalem Philosophical Encounters are a series of bi-annual international symposia, in which philosophers of different backgrounds meet in Jerusalem to discuss a common issue. But, Ramsey claims, classical theories are in a minority in cognitive science, and their hold on the field is shrinking. Simply put, this volume remains on the cutting edge with key insights into the workings of Congress. Demands on a representational theory; 2.
In Chapter One it is correctly pointed out that in order to make headway on the issue of representation, one must focus attention on how the notion is employed in specific cases, as opposed to assuming that different models and domains are dealing with a univocal concept. Humans understand their language thanks to brain processes, and one of the most ambitious endeavors of neurolinguistics is that of bridging the gap between the bare physiology of the brain and linguistic meaning. In Defense of Some 'Cartesian' Assumptions Concerning the Brain and Its Operation. Talk of representation in these cases is overblown: it does not add explanatory value to saying merely that the state is a reliable causal relay. Cognitive agents may infer by examining the structure of mental models that function as surrogates for the world, but the question of how those models get their particular representational content is entirely separate it may be causal, historical, etc.
Proponents of this modeling paradigm have a good claim to biological plausibility and explanatory utility, are proposing models that are quite unlike classical computational models, and yet employ a notion of S-representation that on Ramsey's own analysis is legitimately representational. And the reason for this last premise is that all of the representational genera that were discussed in the chapters organizationally linked to connectionist paradigm were revealed to not be legitimately representational, and the only genera that were found to be genuinely representational were discussed in the chapters organizationally linked to the classical computational paradigm. Schemata and sequential thought processes in pdp models. That is, in order to see the system as one that is breaking the computational task up into subtasks, each of which is handled by a component process, one must see the inputs and outputs of these components as symbols that represent values. This book shows how psychological research is actually moving in a non-representational direction, revealing a radical, though largely unnoticed, shift in our basic understanding of how the mind works.
The emulation theory of representation: Motor control, imagery, and perception. Yet we would not say that the firing pin thereby qualifies as a representation. In a nutshell, Ramsey's claim is that representation talk adds nothing of explanatory value to most of our psychological theories, and is therefore unwarranted. Which of our psychological theories posit entities that fulfill that description? However, computational approaches raise major philosophical and scientific questions. On the positive side, I think that Ramsey presents a powerful challenge to naturalistic theories of representation.
My personal favorite is his discussion of S-representation. Keywords No keywords specified fix it Categories. I would warmly recommend Ramsey's book to anyone working on representation. The problem is that once you have gotten your nifty new product, the representation reconsidered ramsey william m gets a brief glance, maybe a once over, but it often tends to get discarded or lost with the original packaging. They pass the job description test, because understanding them as representing their assigned values is necessary in order to see the subsystem as playing its role in the overall computational system.
Ramsey argues that we can only understand the success of these agents — how these agents manage to make successful inferences about the world — if we understand the elements of their models as representing features of the world. While this last paradigm still freely uses the representation-talk of its predecessor, Ramsey argues that this is a matter of conceptual inertia, and not because the notion of representation in fact plays a helpful or legitimate role in these theories as has been argued in Chapters Four and Five. And it may even be the case that for a single given task, the brain may have more than one means of addressing it. This leaves open that what satisfies the receptor notion, by itself, may not fulfill the job description of a representation, but the wider explanatory role that it plays in explaining successful behaviour may justify its labelling as a representation rather than a causal relay. This explains why the agent's inferences about that activity contribute to her worldly success. There are two points to make about this.
Ramsey argues that none of these uses satisfy the job description associated with representation. The structure of Ramsey's argument repeats a familiar eliminativist strategy c. No, as the firing pin and spark plug cases show, nomic correlation is not sufficient for representational content, and so cannot be it or determine it. If the intentional content is just along for the ride, and does no causal or explanatory work, then there seems no reason to assume that the state in question is specifically representational, rather than, say, a causal relay with the same effects. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation. Representation Reconsidered Ramsey William M can be very useful guide, and representation reconsidered ramsey william m play an important role in your products.
Chapter Six, titled 'Where is the representational paradigm headed? The receptor notion and its problems; 5. Ramsey claims that even with Dretske's appeal to function, the receptor notion is still too weak. There are those who think that neural representation, as neuroscientists understand it, is insufficient for genuine mental representation—that is, the kind of representation that we usually attribute to each other's minds beliefs, desires, mental images, etc. The basic lesson of Chapter Two is that there is a standard approach to understanding the way in which computational theories of mind are representational, but this way does not, in fact, provide for a legitimate notion of representation. To these conditions, Ramsey adds a third and this does most of the work for him. It is an open question whether a single type of representation satisfies both roles.
Cognitive representation is the single most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind and has served as the cornerstone for the so-called 'cognitive revolution'. Ramsey himself is explicit that he does not challenge the receptor notion as a theory of content, only as a theory of what makes something a representation. I would warmly recommend Ramsey's book to anyone working on representation. Everyone who is seriously interested in the philosophy of cognitive science and the status of psychological theorizing should read it. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation. A firing pin in a gun reliably mediates between the pulling of the trigger and the discharge of the round.
Ramsey argues that what is special about isomorphism-based representations is that they stand in for something, they are surrogates for reasoning. For a state to be a mental representation it must: i be capable of having original intentional content, and ii interact causally with other cognitive states. Two notions of representation in the classical computational framework; 4. And once this is done, arguments similar to those launched at the receptor notion come into play. First, it is not clear how it helps Ramsey's argument, it confuses a representational commitment viz.